Pools and Streams: A Theory of Dynamic, Practice-Based Awareness Creation in Mediated-Communication by Riemer, Kal & Haines, Russell
Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons
Information Technology & Decision Sciences
Faculty Publications Information Technology & Decision Sciences
2008
Pools and Streams: A Theory of Dynamic, Practice-




Old Dominion University, rhaines@odu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/itds_facpubs
Part of the Business and Corporate Communications Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Information Technology & Decision Sciences at ODU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Information Technology & Decision Sciences Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
Repository Citation
Riemer, Kal and Haines, Russell, "Pools and Streams: A Theory of Dynamic, Practice-Based Awareness Creation in Mediated-
Communication" (2008). Information Technology & Decision Sciences Faculty Publications. 11.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/itds_facpubs/11
Original Publication Citation
Riemer, K., & Haines, R. (2008). Pools and streams: a theory of dynamic, practice-based awareness creation in mediated-
communication. Proceedings of JAIS Theory Development Workshop. Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Systems, 8(12), 1-41.
Working Papers on Information Systems ISSN 1535-6078
Pools and Streams: A Theory of Dynamic, Practice-Based
Awareness Creation in Mediated-Communication
Kai Riemer
The University of Muenster, Germany
Russell Haines
Old Dominion University, USA
Abstract
In face-to-face contexts, information about the activities, context, emotions, etc. of others is
typically available and often taken for granted. In mediated settings, this awareness
information must be actively signaled by technology or users. In this conceptual paper, we
offer a theory of the dynamic creation of awareness in mediated settings using a metaphor of
pools fed by streams of communication. Pools of awareness are held within users and
gradually fill via signals from others. Users desire different pools to be filled before others
and direct the streams of interaction to feed those pools first. Furthermore, the desired pools
are context and media dependent, but presence, identity, and activity appear to be
fundamental to mediated communication: fed early and taken for granted later. Finally, pools
drain if not actively replenished, and fundamental pools must be refilled when a new
encounter begins. We formulate theoretical propositions according to our line of reasoning
and discuss implications of our proposed theory for mediated communication researchers and
practitioners.
Keywords: awareness, mediated communication, presence, theory building
Permanent URL: http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-12
Copyright: Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works License
Reference: Riemer, K., Haines, R. (2008). "Pools and Streams: A Theory of Dynamic,
Practice-Based Awareness Creation in Mediated-Communication," Proceedings >
Proceedings of JAIS Theory Development Workshop . Sprouts: Working Papers on
Information Systems, 8(12). http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-12
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-12
:?f l Sprouts 
I cc} IMIMll:111 
1 
POOLS AND STREAMS: A THEORY OF DYNAMIC, 
PRACTICE-BASED AWARENESS CREATION IN MEDIATED 
COMMUNICATION 
Abstract 
In face-to-face contexts, information about the activities, context, emotions, etc. of 
others is typically available and often taken for granted. In mediated settings, this 
awareness information must be actively signaled by technology or users. In this 
conceptual paper, we offer a theory of the dynamic creation of awareness in 
mediated settings using a metaphor of pools fed by streams of communication. 
Pools of awareness are held within users and gradually fill via signals from 
others. Users desire different pools to be filled before others and direct the 
streams of interaction to feed those pools first. Furthermore, the desired pools are 
context and media dependent, but presence, identity, and activity appear to be 
fundamental to mediated communication: fed early and taken for granted later. 
Finally, pools drain if not actively replenished, and fundamental pools must be 
refilled when a new encounter begins. We formulate theoretical propositions 
according to our line of reasoning and discuss implications of our proposed 
theory for mediated communication researchers and practitioners. 
Keywords:  awareness, mediated communication, presence, theory building 
Introduction 
People increasingly work and live in distributed contexts, where they and those with whom they 
interact do not share a common physical environment (Leinonen et al., 2005, Mark, 2002). When 
working remotely and using meditated communication, information about others, their activities, 
context, emotions etc. is lost when compared with traditional face-to-face contexts (Scupelli et 
al., 2005). While awareness of others and their activities is relatively easy to maintain or even 
taken for granted in traditional co-located, face-to-face contexts (Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002), 
lack of awareness is believed to create the coordination problems typically seen in distributed 
work, such as inter-group conflicts (Rennecker, 2005).  
Research and design practices in computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW) and human-
computer interaction (HCI) propose that collaboration is enhanced when systems communicate 
awareness information about the presence and activities of the others in the shared workspace 
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(Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Thus, the dominant view in the literature 
favors a technology-centered viewpoint, which typically approaches development with a list of 
suggested awareness features that should be incorporated into systems to foster collaboration 
(Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). According to this notion, awareness via mediated 
communication is provided by technology; the mediating technology either provides a particular 
form of awareness about the other or it does not. 
In contrast with this view, more recent observations suggest that users of collaboration systems 
often manipulate the features of mediated communication systems to create awareness in ways 
that were not predicted by the designers (Frößler, 2006, Riemer et al., 2007). Thus, we adopt a 
practice-based perspective on awareness creation and set out to explore a dynamic notion of 
awareness creation, arguing that awareness is not a dichotomous state and is not created by 
technology. As we will argue, the predominant technology-centric view of awareness fails to 
appreciate the role of human actors in appropriating technologies and in creatively inventing new 
ways of communicating that facilitate awareness creation, even in settings where mediating 
technologies are not targeted at creating awareness. In contrast with the technology-centric view, 
a practice-based perspective is able to account for the variety of ways in which awareness is 
created by people in social contexts. 
We propose a theory that captures the dynamic notion of awareness and moves beyond a 
technology-centric view in that it treats awareness as a product of communicative practices that 
are adapted to technology. To facilitate our discussion, we introduce the metaphor of awareness 
as pools filled gradually by directing streams of communication. Under this dynamic notion, 
users of mediated communication create and shape signals (the streams) to feed pools of 
awareness within themselves and others. Furthermore, all aspects of awareness are not desired 
simultaneously; rather, users have needs for different aspects of awareness, and these needs 
evolve as other awareness needs are satisfied. The pools and streams metaphor is a means to 
organize mediated communication technology design and user-based adaptations to mediating 
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technology into a cohesive framework that accounts for the evolution of needs and the ability of 
users to adapt technology to fulfill those needs. Our theory aims to (1) re-conceptualize the 
nature of awareness, (2) explain the mechanisms of awareness creation (as part of social 
practices) and (3) propose a set of fundamental awareness needs. 
Adopting a human-centered, practice-based view of awareness enables us to understand how and 
why awareness emerges through communication. Using our framework, tool designers and 
researchers can recognize the potential for awareness needs to evolve, while explicitly 
accounting for a user’s desire to direct interaction among various aspects of awareness according 
to their needs and their perceptions of the needs of others. Our framework also appreciates the 
role of the user in adapting, shaping and appropriating technology and their ability to direct 
technology to flexibly fulfill their changing awareness needs. Moreover, it widens the view from 
a design and management standpoint by suggesting a more holistic exploration of the creation of 
awareness in social contexts. Rather than concentrating on the development of new awareness 
technology, our framework shifts the focus to selecting and using technology that flexibly 
supports the emergence of awareness creation practices. Awareness creation in this respect is 
treated not only as a design problem, but also as a technology adoption and management issue.  
We begin with a review of the predominant view of awareness as being technology-centric and 
contrast it with the emerging practice-based view of awareness creation that forms the basis of 
our theory. Next, we offer a thought experiment in which we envision a situation in which no 
awareness of others exists and illustrate how fundamental needs for awareness shape mediated 
communication. Then, we introduce the body of our theory: a dynamic model of awareness 
creation in which awareness is conceived of as being held in pools, which are fed by interaction 
streams directed by users. We formulate a set of propositions to capture the essence of our 
theory. We close the paper with a discussion of implications for IS researchers and practitioners. 
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Conceptualization of awareness in the literature 
Awareness is generally seen as “an understanding of the activities of others, which provides a 
context for your own activity” (Dourish and Bellotti, 1992, 107); it “involves knowing who is 
‘around’, what activities are occurring, who is talking with whom; it provides a view of one 
another in the daily work environments” (Dourish and Bly, 1992, 541). Researchers in computer-
supported cooperative work (CSCW) and the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) have become 
particularly interested in the concept of awareness and its creation through the use of technology, 
proposing that collaboration is enhanced when the corresponding systems communicate 
awareness information about the presence and activities of the others in the shared workspace, 
and providing designers with a list of suggested awareness features that should be incorporated 
into systems to foster collaboration (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002).  
Awareness is the result of technology 
As noted earlier, the creation of awareness is treated in the CSCW and HCI literature as a design 
problem mastered through a development process that aims to enable certain types of awareness 
by means of specific technological features (e.g. Gutwin et al., 1996, Koch, 2005). In doing so, 
different types of awareness are typically distinguished according to the reference object to 
which the awareness is directed - for example, task-related awareness is in relation to the 
activities of people, or social awareness is in relation to emotional states of others (Gross et al., 
2005, Robertson, 2002). Awareness as such is seen as provided by technology; specialized 
awareness applications are developed to address awareness problems (Boyer et al., 1998, 
Ljungstrand and Segerstad, 2000); IT artifacts provide certain awareness functions (Scupelli et 
al., 2005) or features (Borning and Travers, 1991); they gather and provide awareness 
information (Jang et al., 2000) in order to promote (Rennecker, 2005) or support awareness in 
collaborative work (Gutwin and Greenberg, 1996). Research projects in this tradition generally 
aim at creating virtual environments that simulate the real world and its ways of creating 
awareness through inscription in technology (e.g. Borning and Travers, 1991, Boyer et al., 1998, 
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Gutwin and Greenberg, 1996). Consequently, the dominant view of awareness is a technology-
based view, which treats awareness as a product (or even a feature) of technology. 
Awareness is created instantly 
By thinking of it as a product of technology, awareness is consequently seen as being created 
instantly. For example, in the context of Instant Messaging (IM), researchers have stressed the 
importance of what is called the presence awareness capability (Cameron and Webster, 2005). 
This feature typically functions such that an icon signals the status of a user, showing that the 
user’s computer system is online (Carmona, 2008); in essence, the application has registered 
with the IM server (Luo and Liao, 2008). Awareness of presence via IM is thus created instantly 
by way of deriving, transporting and revealing the necessary information (i.e., only delayed 
because of the time required to start the application and connect to the status server); some 
authors have even argued that tools such as IM “support awareness of presence in real-time” 
(Ljungstrand and Segerstad, 2000, 22).   
Awareness is a state 
It can be inferred from the above that awareness in the literature is mainly treated as a state; 
when a particular aspect of awareness is provided, that aspect is fully fashioned in that instant. 
Hence, under this notion awareness of status via IM is complete: visualized for the user and 
others with different icons and/or colors (Herbsleb et al., 2002). By thinking of it as a state, 
awareness is also seen as being dichotomous; in essence, a user is either not aware or aware of a 
particular aspect of their mediated environment. Essentially, the argument is that awareness is 
created in systems by capturing information and presenting it to users (Gutwin and Greenberg, 
1996). Similarly, awareness features are offered to users of other IT artifacts; in social 
networking sites by listing the status and profile changes of their friends, to players in online 
multiplayer games by providing otherwise hidden information about another player’s interactions 
with the gaming application (Moore et al., 2007), and to visitors in a museum by notifying them 
                             Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-12I Ca:) biiiii·II 
when others are looking at or virtually accessing information about the exhibit they are viewing 
(Gross and Specht, 2001). 
In summary, the dominant view in the existing literature is to treat awareness as a property of 
technology, in essence, that awareness is something to be built into or that is instantly created by 
the technology. It is conceptualized as a state and it is implied that awareness as a state can be 
complete. In the following we will challenge this technology-centric notion of awareness and 
pave the way for a theory that treats awareness creation as a dynamic process embedded in social 
practice. 
Toward a theory of dynamic, practice-based awareness creation  
While CMC and HCI research has focused on different objects and types of awareness, discussed 
the need for and implications of awareness, and explored to a great extent the design of 
technologies to produce awareness, relatively little is known about how awareness emerges in 
mediated communication as the result of communication practices (Riemer et al., 2007). Only a 
few recent papers have argued for a dynamic notion of awareness as being based on the 
communicative practices of users instead of simply being created by technology (Heath et al., 
2002, Riemer et al., 2007, Schmidt, 2002). However, this dynamic notion was neither 
conceptualized nor theorized further.  
Riemer et al. (2007) explored awareness creation in five cases in which the same IT artifact was 
used for communication and awareness creation purposes. The authors found a surprising variety 
across the cases of both the types of awareness and the ways in which awareness was created. 
They argue that awareness, as created in context, goes “way beyond what can be expected from 
the tool and its ‘built in’ awareness capabilities.” (Riemer et al., 2007, p. 1). Thus, we suggest 
that awareness and its creation are not adequately explained by the existing conceptualization of 
awareness. Other scholars have similarly argued that awareness is a learned, embodied, skilful 
action, which is why awareness is neither the “product of passively acquired ‘information’” 
(Schmidt, 2002, 292), nor is it a property of technology (Robertson, 2002). Technology is 
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therefore subject to interpretation and appropriation, and awareness can only be achieved by the 
skillful activities of participants in a shared environment who draw upon technology resources in 
the creation of awareness (Riemer et al., 2007).  
While a practice notion has been proposed, to our knowledge no work exists that discusses in a 
systematic and coherent way the production of awareness as a dynamic process with awareness 
being something that is built gradually by users and which can also vanish over time. In the next 
sections, we clarify our motivation for choosing a practice-based view of awareness creation and 
introduce the idea that awareness needs in mediated communication evolve over time. 
Awareness is created through social practice 
As noted earlier, the practice notion treats awareness as emerging from communication practices 
(i.e., the manipulation of technology) rather than as a property of technology. Those that favor 
this more human-centered, practice-based view of technology note that the users of 
communication and collaboration systems often use the technological features in quite 
unexpected ways (i.e., in ways not predicted by the designers) (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994, 
Huysman et al., 2003, Oemig and Gross, 2007). The practice-based approach to awareness 
appreciates the active role of humans and their shared communication practices in the creation of 
awareness (Riemer et al., 2007). This notion does not neglect or even reject technology’s 
influence on awareness creation: we take a position that acknowledges the duality of design and 
practice in the use of collaboration technology – designers create the features that users use to 
create awareness. Thus, the process of creating and communicating awareness information 
among users is shaped by the limitations of a particular technology platform, but users can adapt 
their communication and increase awareness within the bounds of technical limitations by 
shaping their behavior (cf., Walther, 1992).  
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A dynamic notion of awareness creation 
Furthermore, we conceptualize awareness as something within users that may build up slowly 
rather than being instantly created and that needs maintenance rather than being simply fulfilled. 
Thus, we introduce a dynamic, evolving notion of awareness – the formation of different aspects 
of awareness over time by interactants. We will argue that different aspects of awareness about 
one’s environment do not develop at the same time; rather, certain aspects of awareness are 
sought first and, once attained, lead one to seek awareness about other aspects. In doing so, we 
will also move away from a static and general classification of awareness types and suggest that 
awareness needs are highly context- and interactant-dependent: the types of awareness that are 
needed and thus attended to by interactants vary by context and individual, and those needs 
evolve over time. 
Consequently, we suggest that awareness in mediated environments (1) is based on, or more 
precisely, emerges from social practice, and thus does not emerge solely from, nor is it entirely 
limited by technology; (2) is not instantly created, but develops gradually, often slowly, through 
the practices of users; and (3) that the salient objects of awareness are not pre-specified and 
constant within a given context, rather the salience of objects is dynamic and changes according 
to the needs of users. 
Theory development 
In the following we propose a theory for explaining awareness and its creation in social 
encounters. Following the taxonomy proposed by Gregor (2006) our theory qualifies as a type II 
theory, a theory that aims at explaining how and why things are. In that respect, our theory aims 
at making three contributions to further our understanding of awareness: (1) explaining the 
nature of awareness (how should awareness be conceptualized?), (2) explaining the mechanisms 
of awareness creation (how is awareness created?), and (3) introducing the idea of fundamental 
types of awareness and the otherwise situation-dependent nature of awareness needs (why is 
awareness needed in distributed social encounters?). In order to do so, we will introduce the 
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pools and streams metaphor as a means for capturing the dynamic nature of awareness and 
present a set of propositions that further clarify the understanding of awareness creation. 
While our theory aims at explaining awareness and the mechanisms that facilitate its creation, it 
does not aim at making generalizable predictions that can be readily tested in empirical research 
(type IV theory). This is partly due to the context-dependent nature of the types of awareness 
needed (i.e., we propose that awareness needs to vary in specific social contexts). However, in 
the discussion section. we will briefly discuss ways of operationalizing our theory and deriving 
hypotheses about awareness needs in specific application contexts. . 
We begin with a thought experiment, which envisions a situation where virtually no awareness 
of others exists, and illustrate how different aspects of awareness are created by way of 
communication and how awareness of others gradually develops over time. As such, the thought 
experiment serves two purposes. Firstly, it introduces the most fundamental types of awareness, 
which we suggest are universal and needed independent of context. Secondly, it provides a first 
illustration of the dynamic view of awareness creation, in which awareness is conceived of as 
being held in pools that are fed by streams of information that are directed by users. The main 
body of the theory is then presented afterwards as a set of propositions clarifying in detail the 
nature of awareness and the mechanisms of awareness creation. We conclude with implications 
for research and practice. 
Fundamental awareness needs in distributed communication 
The following thought experiment introduces the most fundamental types of awareness by 
illustrating a situation in which no awareness exists at the beginning of a social encounter. We 
acknowledge that this situation is to a certain extent a simplification, but we believe that a 
thought experiment allows us to clarify the basic mechanisms and underlying concepts of 
awareness creation in a mediated communication context.  
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Thought experiment 
Imagine a situation in which an experimenter leads a person to a computer terminal. No other 
people are present, but on the computer a chat program is running (Figure 1). There is nothing on 
the screen other than the window, only a flashing cursor. What will the person do? There is no 
indication that another person or persons is at “the other end” and will respond to messages, only 
the implicit suggestion that something might happen if he/she enters something, which comes 
from his/her prior experience with “experimenters,” “computer terminals,” and “chat programs.” 
 
Figure 1: Transcript of Thought Experiment Chat 
Once seated, the person types “Hi” and presses enter. His/her “Hi” then appears on the upper part 
of the chat screen. A short time later, “Hi. Who is this?” also appears on the upper part of the 
screen. He/she types “This is Pat. Who are you?” and presses enter. A short time later, “Oh, this 
is Jordan” appears. From here, a conversation can unfold: it might concern a recent party that 
each of them attended, a discussion of current political issues, or anything else that they might 
wish to talk about. 
This situation illustrated in our thought experiment is different from most communication in that 
there were relatively few assumptions that were made by the participant up front. Initially, there 
is little sense that another person will receive and respond to his/her messages. After the first 
entry, he/she can see that the computer system is at least processing his/her messages, but still 
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must assume that there is the potential for another person to receive and respond to his/her 
messages. After the first reply is received, he/she can only be sure that at least one other is 
receiving their message. Eventually, he/she learns the name of the person with which he/she is 
communicating. Over a longer conversation, he/she might learn the likes/dislikes of the person, 
aspects of the physical environment in which the other is located, etc. 
Our aim in portraying this thought experiment is to offer the notion that when people interact via 
mediated communication (computer, telephone, teletype, or otherwise), there is a minimum 
amount of awareness that must exist within an individual before interaction will occur. 
Furthermore, once this minimal level of awareness is achieved, each person will desire to meet 
certain additional information needs about the others (cf., Berger and Calabrese, 1975). These 
information needs are filled by awareness, and we suggest that some needs are more fundamental 
than others.  
Presence 
In our thought experiment, and in any mediated communication, the minimum need of a person 
seems to be a belief that another might receive and respond to their messages, in essence, to 
answer the question “Anybody there?” (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999, 9 and 16). As interaction 
proceeds, this awareness can build so that one has a sense that another will quite assuredly 
respond within a few moments, and, given sufficient time and message exchanges, build to the 
point where one has a feeling that another is attending to the interaction in much the same way 
that one would sense it when face-to-face (i.e., propinquity) (Walther, 1992). It is important to 
clarify at this point that our notion of presence so far refers to the presence in a virtual space. 
Hence, it could also be termed ‘virtual presence’ to distinguish it from the bodily presence of 
someone in the ‘real’ world. Giddens (1984) denotes with presence a ‘being there’ (i.e. Dasein) 
of someone; a bodily existence, which refers to the being in a physical location or context, 
engaged in and/or available for communication. But Giddens also recognizes that “although the 
‘full conditions of co-presence’ exist only in unmediated contact between those who are 
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physically present, mediated contacts that permit some of the intimacies of co-presence are made 
possible in the modern era by electronic communication” (Giddens, 1984, 88). Hence, in 
mediated communication, awareness of the other’s presence can extend to a degree that a 
sensation of co-presence occurs (Riemer et al., 2007). 
In a mediated context, one also has to be physically present in that one must be located near and 
capable of manipulating a mediating technology (Riemer et al., 2007). However, others do not 
necessarily need an awareness of one’s physical location, although this may emerge with more 
messages. Consequently, in mediated communication, awareness of the presence of others can 
range from the most basic sense that “someone is out there” (i.e., Gegenwart) to a point where 
one also gains an understanding of the bodily presence and context of others in the real world 
(e.g. the other is sitting at a desk in an office near a phone) and which might lead to a sensation 
of nearness or co-presence. 
Thus, we suggest that the most fundamental need in mediated communication is awareness that 
another is present. In our thought experiment, the desire for minimal presence awareness is 
communicated in the first message: “Hi,” and is filled with the response “Hi. Who is this?” After 
awareness of another’s presence has been established (i.e., he/she knows that someone else is 
present in the virtual environment), we suggest, although they may be attended to later, two other 
forms of awareness are equally important to interaction via mediated communication.  
Activity 
Activity refers to the degree to which one is aware that something has happened, is happening, or 
is likely to happen in the shared virtual space (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002, 
Steinfield et al., 1999). Awareness of activity likewise ranges, from a sense that something might 
happen to knowledge of what has happened, perhaps eventually reaching the point where one 
may feel that he/she understands why things happened and has a sense of what will happen next. 
Activity awareness is fundamental in that one could not really be considered interacting in the 
shared space if one could not observe the messages and activities of another, and similarly, if one 
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did not feel that one’s actions were being observed by others. Activity awareness is provided as 
the mediating technology communicates the messages and/or behavior of others in the shared 
space. In our thought experiment, activity awareness minimally arises as the first “Hi” appears in 
the upper section of the chat window, and rises further when the response “Hi. Who is this?” 
appears. 
Identity 
Identity refers to the degree to which one is aware that others in the mediated space are distinct 
individuals (Gross and Specht, 2001, Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Identity awareness ranges 
from a sense of the quantity of others that are present (i.e., feeling that one or several others are 
present) to a feeling that one can distinguish among distinct others (i.e., Unterscheidbarkeit), 
perhaps eventually reaching the point where one may feel that he/she can precisely quantify the 
number and personally identify the others in the shared space. This awareness is increased as one 
observes that distinct others are acting in the shared space. We emphasize that the identity 
awareness need may not necessarily require knowing the given name of the others (a.k.a. 
organizational identity); rather the initial need may simply be a desire to sense the others present 
as individuals rather than being an amorphous mass of “others”. A desire to know, and 
eventually knowledge of given names arising later in an interaction exemplifies our notion that 
awareness can vary over time. In our thought experiment, identity awareness arises as the person 
begins to feel that one other person is present in the mediated space. This happens as the 
comments of the other appear, and the apparent continuity of the comments: in the reply “Hi. 
Who is this?”, the “Who is this?” is assumed to indicate that another person has received the first 
message and is responding. With “Oh. This is Jordan”, the “Oh” is assumed to be a reply to the 
prior comment, and increases awareness that only one other person is present. Messages about 
likes/dislikes, previous experiences, etc. further enhance the identity of the other. 
We suggest that identity awareness is distinct from activity awareness in that it is possible for 
one to observe and understand the activities in a mediated space without needing to have a clear 
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idea of which entity had performed which activity. Thus, the activity and comments of others can 
potentially be observed and responded to without necessarily needing to know the identity of the 
others interacting in the shared space (i.e. it is possible to interact with an undefined number of 
‘others’). Similarly, there may be features of the mediating technology that communicate the 
identity of those present in the mediated space without requiring any contributions by them. This 
distinction between activity and identity awareness facilitates the ideal of being able to interact 
anonymously via mediated communication without fear that others will be able to identify, and 
thus evaluate one’s comments. However, we note that identity awareness has been shown to 
emerge in anonymous situations with user practices or given enough activity in the shared space 
(cf., Hayne et al., 2003, McLeod, 2000, Walther, 1992), suggesting that users will eventually 
direct themselves to linking activities to a particular persona. 
Role of Awareness in Reducing Uncertainty 
In all interaction, each person’s action “is determined by his assumption of the action of the 
others” (Mead, 1934, 154). In face-to-face interaction and via familiar communication media, 
individuals shape their interaction and interpretation of the actions of others in the context of 
their prior experience with a similar context, “taking the role of the other … going through 
certain rites which are the representation of what these individuals are supposed to be doing” 
(Mead, 1934, 153). The fundamental driver of behavior in the initial stages of face-to-face 
interaction is a need to reduce uncertainty (Berger and Calabrese, 1975). We suggest that in a 
less familiar mediated context (e.g., our thought experiment), uncertainty is increased even 
further and extends into other areas because much of the contextual awareness that would be 
available to interactants in face-to-face communication cannot be as easily assumed, even when 
displayed directly by the technology. Thus, we propose that interactants reduce the uncertainty 
that arises in mediated communication by actively signaling their presence, identity, and 
activities to others, and that these and other aspects of awareness are needed in order to create the 
“generalized other”, which forms the fundamental basis for interaction (cf., Mead, 1934). 
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In mediated communication, information about others is limited when compared with face-to-
face interactions. In our thought experiment, the person sitting in front of the computer may be 
unsure about very fundamental things that would be taken for granted when speaking face-to-
face or when using a familiar mediated communication with a familiar other. We recognize that 
individuals do indeed wish to reduce uncertainty in the initial stages of interaction, and our 
thought experiment is prototypical of an initial interaction involving strangers (Berger and 
Calabrese, 1975); however, reflecting the need to consider the other when interacting, we suggest 
that one has a particular set of fundamental notions about others for which uncertainty needs to 
be reduced. In mediated communication, these include the aspects of awareness we noted earlier: 
whether others are present, whether activity will take place, and how to distinguish among the 
others. We further suggest that these notions about others accumulate as the signals are 
exchanged via the communication technology. In the following section, we introduce our 
conceptualization of the creation and maintenance of awareness through user actions using the 
metaphor of pools that are filled by streams of communication: we describe as pools the different 
aspects of awareness that are gradually filled as user actions direct streams of signals to create 
awareness (i.e., by manipulating the features of the communication technology). The pools and 
streams metaphor also frames our notion of the sequential emergence of different types of 
awareness in the course of communication as illustrated in our thought experiment. 
A Theory of Awareness: Pools and Streams 
When a person is immersed in an unfamiliar context with little empirical information about their 
surroundings (e.g., the man waking up in darkness in The Pit and the Pendulum (Poe, 2003), the 
interactants in our thought experiment), their awareness of everything emerges slowly and builds 
upon very basic components: whether there are other objects (or people) in the space, what are 
the dimensions of the space, where are the other objects in the space, what are the characteristics 
of the objects in the space. We suggest that these different aspects of the environment about 
which one is or desires to be aware should be thought of as separate pools of awareness.  
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Moreover, we propose that awareness is formed from streams of information, which fills the 
pools. The streams are directed by the practices of the interactants, as when a user provides a 
specific component of awareness (i.e. filling a particular pool). In the earlier thought experiment, 
the reply “This is Pat” represents a stream directed to identity. Streams can also be 
technologically directed, as when a chat room attaches a first name or other identifier 
automatically to every comment. In the following, we first elaborate on the notion of the pools, 
before discussing the mechanism for filling the pools, which is via streams that are directed by 
the communication practices of users. As we elaborate and discuss the implications of pools and 
streams of awareness, we will formulate a set of propositions that explain the key aspects of our 
awareness understanding. 
Pools of awareness 
We propose that the various types of awareness be conceived of as pools that are filled over time 
as interactants direct streams of signaling information. In our thought experiment, the presence 
pool fills as the other sends messages: at first, one can only be sure that another responded to the 
first message; over time, he/she will begin to feel that the other will remain present and not 
unexpectedly stop responding. The presence pool can continue to fill, meaning the awareness of 
the other’s presence might extend to a more profound understanding of the other person’s bodily 
context. Hence, we argue that awareness of others emerges as a pool starts filling (e.g. in our 
thought experiment the initial exchange might be seen as the ‘first drop’ into the pool); as 
interaction proceeds the pool then continues to fill over time, which can lead to a more profound 
level of awareness. Consequently, the notion of a pool exemplifies how there can be relative 
levels of awareness over the course of an interaction. For example, one can initially have a sense 
that there are some people present in a chat room, then, after interacting for a time, one might 
have a sense that there are four different people. 
In contrast to the technology-centered view, we also emphasize that interface elements that are 
designed to convey awareness do not inevitably lead to a full pool. As noted earlier, an IM 
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interface typically shows a list of contacts by screen name, along with their status: online, busy, 
away, or offline. However, while a status icon that shows “online” may heighten awareness of 
the others’ presence, the presence awareness pool is not completely filled through this kind of 
information. As examples, (1) the person may have stepped away from their computer without 
updating their status, (2) someone else might be using that person’s computer, and (3) the person 
might be working on another task not actually available for interaction. Similarly, a chat room’s 
list of present members does not necessarily ensure that all of the others are attending to the 
conversation, and although one might see that another is in front of their computer when video 
conferencing, one may not be completely sure that he/she is attending to the conversation until 
he/she speaks. 
Proposition 1: Awareness develops gradually over time. In essence, awareness behaves 
like a pool that is filled by streams of interaction over the course of an encounter. 
Taking the pools metaphor a step further, we also suggest that awareness declines over time 
when signals from others stop. For example, one can have a clear sense that there were four 
others present in a chat room at the time one left; however, awareness of who will be there two 
hours later is less certain, and one may not have a sense that anyone will be present at all after 
several months. Thus, we suggest that pools of awareness must be actively replenished because 
they gradually drain over time. Similar draining effects are likely to occur via asynchronous 
communication such as e-mail or web forums – when others do not respond to ones messages or 
posts; one’s pool of awareness about their presence will decline. 
Proposition 2: Awareness requires active maintenance or else it declines over time. In 
essence, awareness pools drain over time. 
Recognizing that each interactant might deal with the uncertainty in mediated communication 
differently, we further suggest that these pools of awareness are within the interacting 
individuals. Pools of awareness are not a group level phenomenon, meaning that there is not a 
general store of awareness for a group; rather, the members of a group are likely to have different 
levels in their pools, based on their own prior experiences and interpretation of the signals of 
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others. The variability in pools within group members is exemplified when a new person joins 
the interaction of several others. Those that have been engaged in the interaction might be aware 
that three other people are present, while the new person may only have a sense that more than 
one other is present. 
Proposition 3: Awareness is an individual and not a group-level or workspace-level 
construct. In essence, awareness pools are located within people. 
Our first three propositions described the dynamic nature of awareness of being conceived as 
pools within people that fill gradually and can drain over time. The following propositions 
further clarify how pools (i.e., awareness needs) in individuals are linked to each other within 
individuals and the others with whom they interact. Similar to theories of group development 
(Tuckman and Jensen, 1977; Wheelan, 1994), we suggest that some types of awareness must at 
least be attended to before an interactant using mediated communication will attend to others. As 
elaborated on in detail in our thought experiment, the most fundamental component of awareness 
in a mediated communication environment seems to be presence, or the feeling that others will 
attend to one’s signals; this awareness is formed by signals provided by the application and/or by 
others. Once one feels that others are present in the environment, other types of awareness will 
be sought, the most basic of which are activity and identity. We propose that these three types of 
awareness needs are universal across contexts. 
Proposition 4: The fundamental types of awareness (i.e., pools) in mediated 
communication are presence, identity and activity. 
As a particular pool is filled to a certain extent, one can begin to take that aspect of awareness for 
granted. For example, once one can take for granted that the other will remain present and not 
unexpectedly stop responding, that store of presence awareness means that he/she can move on 
to other matters (e.g., determining the identity of the person); not having to re-establish the 
presence of the other before sending each message. Thus, we suggest that, depending on the 
needs of the interactants, certain types of awareness will be prerequisites for others (Figure 2). In 
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general, identity awareness will not be sought until there is at least a minimal sense of presence 
awareness; likewise, activity awareness will not be sought without minimal presence awareness. 
The different types of awareness accumulate (i.e. the different pools fill) as the interaction 
proceeds, providing one with a store of information upon which to base later signals to others 
(i.e., a sense of the generalized other). Hence, awareness in a communication encounter can be 
thought of as a hierarchy of awareness pools, with lower level pools including aspects of 
awareness such as roles, preferences, skills, emotional states, etc. The hierarchy of awareness 
pools that was discussed in the thought experiment is shown graphically in Figure 2. We 
emphasize that prerequisite pools, once filled, do not spill over to automatically fill other pools. 
In Figure 2 we connect the pools using arrows. However, the arrows are there only to indicate 
those pools that are prerequisites to others. We propose that later pools are dependent on prior 
pools in that the prior pools will need to have a minimal level of awareness (i.e., a “first drop”) 
before the later pool will be filled, but that the information used to fill the prior pool does not 
“spill over” and fill the later pool. For example, a message that is accompanied by a photograph 
and name can simultaneously convey identity and activity, but having identity information on 
each message does not mean that identity information “spills over” from the identity pool into 
other pools once it is filled, rather, identity will just be taken for granted (i.e., that aspect of 
awareness in the stream will be taken for granted). Thus, the later pools are fed because the 
interactants are choosing to direct their attention (i.e., their streams – see below) to another 
matter once they feel the prerequisite pools have been adequately filled. 
Proposition 5: In a mediated communication encounter, some aspects of awareness are 
prerequisites of others. In essence, the pools take the form of a hierarchy. 
 
 




Figure 2: Pool Hierarchy in Thought Experiment 
 
In order to further illustrate the hierarchy of pools, in the following sections we discuss examples 
of awareness creation in consensus groups and task-oriented groups. An extended example of the 
hierarchy of pools of awareness via mediated communication is a situation in which members of 
a group are told to reach agreement on a jury award (Figure 3). When their comments are 
completely anonymous, the group members apparently feel that they need to be able to 
individually identify (differentiate between) the comments of other members, leading them to 
insert identifiers into their comments (McLeod, 2000)1. Thus, in this situation, minimal 
awareness of identity is needed to enable group members to become aware of the preferences of 
other members. Awareness of the preferences within the group is needed before group members 
determine the degree to which they will be influenced by others, which must occur before the 
group can reach agreement (Haines et al. (2006) found less group influence when identifiers 
were not used). 
                                                 
1 Similar behavior is observed in anonymous online forums. 
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Figure 3: Pool Hierarchy in Agreement Group 
However, in task-oriented groups, the hierarchy of awareness needs leads to a different goal, 
with users focusing instead on becoming aware of the skills of specific others so that roles can be 
effectively assigned (Goffman, 1961). For example, virtual team members apparently feel that 
they need to know a person’s skill at accomplishing an information-processing task in order for 
them to be assigned a particular role in the group (Haines and Scamell, 2003). Roles and 
structures within a task-oriented group also evolve as group members become more aware of 
each other, using their context-dependent set of pools (cf., Oemig and Gross, 2007). In a task-
oriented group these pools seem to begin with awareness that others are present, an awareness of 
their distinct identities, and awareness of the activities that are taking place. As these attain 
minimal pools, group members appear to then wish to become aware of the degree to which one 
possesses a particular skill and is dependable; then they can become aware that one can be 
cognitively trusted to fulfill a role (McAllister, 1995). Taking this still further, before building 
awareness about whether one is appropriately assigned to a role, group members might desire 
pools of awareness about whether one is available and can be cognitively trusted (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Pool Hierarchy in Task-Oriented Group 
Comparing the pool hierarchies for agreement versus task-oriented groups illustrates the 
potential for prerequisite pools to differ by context. We emphasize that there are many, many 
more pools possible, even in these relatively simple contexts. Indeed, it is probably not possible 
to identify all of the pools that might be desired by interactants, because as an encounter 
proceeds, one might suddenly get the urge to become aware of something that is ostensibly 
unrelated to the task at hand, but that might have relevance to a relationship (e.g., how many 
children another has, or what they are doing the next weekend). The pool hierarchy may also be 
extended as the encounter proceeds. For example, one group member may wait to build 
awareness about whether another is appropriately assigned to a role in a task-oriented group until 
after one had learned whether the other had a preference toward performing the role and whether 
the activity itself had a purpose toward the groups’ goals, in addition to the pools noted earlier. 
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Thus, we suggest that while providing lists of typical pools of awareness in various contexts is 
certainly useful to technology designers, it should not be seen as an end in itself, because users 
may have other matters to which they wish to attend. 
Proposition 6: Awareness needs are highly context-dependent. In essence, the selection 
of pools that need to be filled is different across contexts. 
We have suggested that pools are not filled all at the same time; specifically, that some pools are 
prerequisites for others and thus filled early in an encounter, while others are filled later in an 
encounter. Drawing on this implicit notion of a hierarchy of pools, we further suggest that 
higher-level pools are shallow in the sense that they are easier to fill, but also drain much faster 
than lower-level pools. For example, while awareness of how many people are in a mediated 
environment (e.g. a chat room) can be established quite quickly, awareness of another’s 
preferences, political views, and/or organizational status takes much longer to be created. 
However, being more profound (i.e., deeper), these aspects of awareness are also much more 
stable. Hence, while awareness that is encounter-specific drains quickly, awareness that is 
relationship-specific is much more lasting and can be drawn upon even after months of not 
interacting. The latter (relationship-specific) information is relatively long-lived in mediated 
communication when compared with the fundamental pools of presence, identity, and activity. 
Such fundamental aspects need some replenishment at the initiation of each new encounter. We 
offer two simple examples that illustrate the need to replenish fundamental awareness pools. (1) 
One may have uncertainty about when another will be available to read and reply to an important 
e-mail, and may request that the other reply immediately to indicate that it has been received. (2) 
One may have uncertainty about whether another is available for a voice call via Skype, and may 
request such information via an e-mail or a chat message (even if the other’s status flag shows 
that they are online). 
Proposition 7: Fundamental types of awareness are more encounter-dependent and are 
developed quicker. In addition, the stores of more fundamental types of awareness also 
decline much more rapidly than other types of awareness, which are of personal or 
relationship information. In essence, higher-level pools in a hierarchy fill faster, but must 
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be replenished with each encounter, while lower-level pools are filled much later, but 
retain their levels for longer. 
In this section we firstly proposed a dynamic conceptualization of awareness, which conceives 
awareness as pools located within people that fill gradually over time and which also drain when 
not being maintained. Three propositions explain the pool notion of awareness, while the next 
four propositions elaborate on the relationships between pools: awareness needs (pools) in a 
social encounter form a hierarchy of dependencies, with the actual selection of pools being 
context-dependent, while three needs (presence, activity and identity) are seen as universal. Also, 
higher-level pools in the hierarchy are encounter-dependent and shallow, in that they fill and 
drain quickly, while lower-level pools are seen as relationship-dependent and deeper, in that they 
take more time to fill, but will last longer. Having explained the nature of awareness and the 
context-dependency of awareness needs, we will now turn to explaining the mechanisms of 
awareness creation as captured in the streams notion. 
Directing the Streams: A Practice-based notion of awareness creation 
In contrast to the technology-centric view, we argue that it is the interactants in a specific 
situation that create awareness through their communication and shared work practices, and that 
awareness is not simply provided by technology. As such, awareness is the result of shared, 
mutual practices of signaling and observing. People signal awareness information to others and 
likewise perceive what others are signaling. We conceive of these signals, created by the 
interactants, as streams of awareness information. Awareness emerges as people fill their pools 
of awareness by drawing on the available streams (i.e., by observing the signals that are carried 
by the technology).  
Furthermore, we suggest that one’s interaction is guided by a view of the generalized other. 
Hence, the signals one sends are determined by two considerations: one wishes to fill specific 
awareness pools, and one recognizes that others wish to fill similar pools. Thus, awareness is 
based on the concept of projection; as one engages in signaling, conveying certain aspects of 
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awareness, one projects one’s own situation and awareness needs to the others in order to 
determine the signals one sends to others. At the same time one expects to be similarly signaled 
by others (i.e., reciprocity). Hence, the kinds of awareness streams that are created are dependent 
on the ways in which interactants perceive each other. 
Ultimately, signaling and observing can be seen as two sides of the same coin in the creation of 
awareness; they form a duality with both concepts relying on each other, as the observing of 
information and activities that are relevant for one person requires that information to be 
displayed by others.  
Proposition 8: Awareness results from mutual practices of signaling awareness 
information and observing this information.  
Proposition 8a: Awareness information is conveyed through social signaling 
practices. In essence, the streams, which convey awareness information, are 
initiated/created by interactants. 
Proposition 8b: Awareness emerges when awareness information is observed and 
used by interactants. In essence, the pools within interactants fill as a result of 
capturing the awareness information flowing from the streams. 
The streams metaphor is also important because it emphasizes that the signals that move among 
interactants can be directed deliberately to fill certain pools. Considering that one has goals for 
an interaction, these goals influence what he/she attends and what they wish to be attended to. 
For example, consider the member of a group that is thrust into a chat room and told to 
determine whether a course of action is ethical or unethical. First, he/she must be assured that 
his/her comments will be attended to. This assurance might come externally (i.e., from a face-to-
face interaction) or when he/she sees the comments of another appear on their screen. Once the 
presence of others has been determined, he/she will shape the interaction according to what 
he/she feel is important and his/her perceptions of what others feel is important. Thus, the 
streams may be directed toward personally identifying others, achieving an affective relationship 
with others, or simply to aspects of their task. This understanding of interactants deliberately 
directing the streams to fill certain pools complements the notion of the hierarchy of pools 
(proposition 5) and the context-specificity of awareness needs (proposition 6).  
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Proposition 9: Interactants deliberately attend to certain types of awareness before 
others. In essence, awareness streams are directed by the interactants in both signaling 
and observing in order to fill certain pools before others. 
Awareness as portrayed so far is not a feature of technology, but the result of shared practices in 
which the technology becomes embedded. “Essentially, defining awareness only in terms of 
technical software features ignores the subtle ways in which groups are able to create awareness 
through their shared practices of using technology.” (Riemer et al., 2007, 13) However, 
technology plays an unquestionably vital role in the process of awareness creation by enabling 
and also constraining social practices: while technology cannot per se produce awareness, 
specific technological features enable (or constrain) the creation of awareness. Furthermore, such 
features still have to be appropriated by interactants; meaning that signals ostensibly produced by 
the technology are actually under the control of the interactants and may be observed in 
unintended ways (e.g., the modification of IM screen names to display status information (Smale 
and Greenberg, 2005). Hence, while awareness is created through practice the technology acts as 
an enabler; communication technology is the medium that carries the streams of awareness 
information and as such enables the practices to emerge. 
Proposition 10: Technology plays a vital role in awareness creation as it acts as a 
medium and enabler. In essence, the streams are carried by technology. 
We also recognize that by shifting attention to a particular aspect of awareness as they interact, 
participants in an interaction fill that particular pool at a faster rate than others. Hence, we argue 
that streams have volume. This volume is to a considerable extent determined by the nature and 
characteristics of the communication medium. Noting that a stream of communication has both 
volume and particular content, increasing the overall volume of interaction (e.g., using voice 
communication rather than text (Walther, 1992)), is likely to mean more rapidly accumulating 
pools of awareness over a given time. This notion is consistent with theories such as social 
presence theory (Short et al., 1976) or media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1984), which 
suggest that technologies differ in terms of the kinds of signals they are capable of transmitting, 
with some media providing richer or wider channels. We argue that richer channels are likely to 
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convey multiple aspects of awareness, meaning that interactants can direct the streams of 
awareness toward filling pools more rapidly or even multiple pools simultaneously. At the same 
time, because mediated communication channels are often quite limited in the amount of 
information that can be conveyed, interactants must choose what information to communicate, 
and recognize that others are similarly able to choose.  
Proposition 11: Interactants can influence the speed of awareness creation, especially by 
selecting certain media over others. In essence, streams have volume (the rate with which 
pools fill), which is limited by the characteristics of the medium. 
Finally, with regard to practices of signaling and observing, two levels of engagement can be 
distinguished: active and latent. Active signaling refers to the user deliberately conveying certain 
information in order to fill a particular pool of awareness (i.e., feeding and directing a certain 
stream). In our thought experiment, with the statement “This is Pat”, the user actively signals 
identity. On the other hand, signaling can also be latent, meaning signals are often conveyed as a 
by-product of other activities. For example, the pools reliability and skill might be filled as a by-
product of users behaving in a corresponding way during the course of the interaction. Rather 
than having to actively communicate skill the respective signals are picked up by others as the 
result of the user carrying out a task that requires a particular skill.  
Furthermore, we recognize that awareness tools can help filling a particular pool even if the 
participants do not focus their attention on that particular dimension. For example, instant 
messaging tools provide status features in their interfaces for providing presence awareness; 
providing additional information about presence that would ordinarily require an exchange of 
signals (e.g., available, off line, do not disturb, etc.). This means one can initiate an awareness 
stream by allowing the technology to convey these presence-related signals, without having to 
actively attend to feeding this stream later while the stream continues to be delivered by the 
technology. And finally, on certain occasions, entirely new streams of awareness might spring up 
involuntarily as by-product of the practice one is engaged in during that particular encounter. An 
example would be the colleague who enters one’s office (as part of a work practice) while one is 
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engaged in a phone conversation with another and thereby conveys certain personal information 
to others on the other end of the phone line. 
In the same way as signaling, observing can also be active and conscious, in the sense of paying 
attention, or be rather latent or peripheral, in the sense of being an implicit part of other 
activities. On the one hand one might actively monitor the signals coming from others, as when 
one actively observes who is online in the contact list of IM. Hence, one can actively direct 
streams provided by others to fill one’s pools of awareness. On the other hand, while observing 
the stream of communication related to one particular pool of awareness, one might at the same 
time observe information about others that is only peripherally relevant to an overall goal of the 
interaction, but is nevertheless added to an awareness pool (i.e., “filed away”). Observing can 
thus be rather implicit, almost like noticing the light or noises coming from a colleague’s office 
in passing. In this case, awareness pools are filled with relatively little observational effort. 
Consequently, we conclude that both signaling and observing can be, but need not be the result 
of deliberate user action, rather awareness can arise almost subconsciously as the by-product of 
other activities or be a part of general communication (e.g. while one is talking on the phone, 
background noise might provide a notion of the other’s physical presence and location). 
Proposition 12: Both signaling and observation of awareness information can happen 
either actively or as by-product of other practices. 
Proposition 12a: Awareness information can be actively provided through 
communication or be conveyed as by-product of other practices. In essence, while 
some streams are deliberately created and fed, others spring up unintentionally 
and/or continue to be delivered by technology. 
Proposition 12b: Awareness information can be actively sought by monitoring the 
virtual workspace or be perceived in the form of peripheral information while 
being engaged in other activities. In essence, interactants can actively direct 
streams to fill their pools, while other pools can be filled without effort. 
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Discussion 
In the preceding sections, we introduced a theory that describes a dynamic notion of awareness 
and explains why and how awareness is created via mediated communication. Our theory is 
somewhat general in that the pools and streams notion could be applied to all forms of 
communication. For example, uncertainty reduction theory (URT) suggests that uncertainty in 
face-to-face encounters is particularly salient in “the initial stages of interaction between 
strangers” (Berger and Calabrese, 1975, 110), and similar to our notion that pools of awareness 
drain over time, URT suggests that “persons who do not have frequent contact with each other 
become uncertain about each other” (p. 110). However, we feel that our pools and streams theory 
identifies issues about obtaining and maintaining awareness that are uniquely suited to research 
and design in mediated contexts, because fundamental awareness needs recur with each 
encounter, while these needs are taken for granted in face-to-face encounters. Our framework 
builds from the notion that one needs to reduce uncertainty when communicating, but we 
emphasize the need to understand which uncertainty needs occur when one uses a new mediated 
communication tool, and which uncertainty needs will recur after interaction ceases for a time. 
Correspondingly, in our theory, the pools of awareness represent uncertainty needs. In the 
following, we will discuss implications of our theory for mediated communication researchers 
and then for tool designers in practice. 
Implications for Researchers 
Most studies in the CSCW and HCI domains have treated awareness as a design problem: tools 
need to be built in certain ways in order to enable awareness. Gross and colleagues suggest that 
“existing CSCW applications only partially support…awareness“ and that in order “to enrich the 
existing CSCW applications with the missing features” empirical research is needed to 
constantly identify gaps in awareness support; also, “novel behaviors might be recognized that 
lead, in turn, to novel features, and so forth” (Gross et al., 2005, 356). In the information systems 
domain, historically, mediated communication research has argued from a similar technology 
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determinist position and hence been slow to recognize the role of user practices in influencing 
behavior and the usage of technology. For example, early media richness theorists proposed that 
mediated communication technologies left users without the feeling of the presence of others 
(Short et al., 1976), and were only appropriate for formal and less equivocal tasks (Rice, 1993), 
while later research suggested that mediated communication was appropriate and even 
encouraged informal communication (Walther, 1995), and was employed by managers for 
equivocal communication tasks (Markus, 1994). Similarly, GDSS researchers generally believed 
that their tools would be used in specific ways and lead to specific “process gains” in decision 
making groups (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987); only to later advocate the notion that user 
practices in the social setting were a powerful mediating force (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). 
However, a technology determinist position, which expects certain awareness effects as a direct 
consequence from applying communication media in context, as well as a design-oriented view, 
which treats awareness as the outcome of designing and providing certain feature combinations, 
both fail to account for the agency of users and their inventiveness and creativity in creating 
awareness from communication and from using tools in unexpected ways. In this respect, 
designing sophisticated awareness technology might actually turn out to be too restrictive; such 
technologies might not fit the particular context and also the need for awareness in context might 
change over time. As Heath et al. state: “…solutions which attempt to specify the width and 
focus of awareness a priori are unlikely to support even the most simple forms of collaborative 
activity.” (2002, 345)  
While researchers have recognized the fundamental needs for presence, identity, and activity 
awareness (Haines and Cooper, Forthcoming), when designing tools to support these needs, 
however, these researchers assumed that technology tools would provide those needs without 
recognizing that users must actively participate in awareness creation. Accepting the technology-
based view of awareness without acknowledging user practices could lead to user frustration 
when technology “adapts” to the evolution of a group and leaves the group without a previously 
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taken for granted tool (Oemig and Gross, 2007), and lead to unexpected effects when the users 
do not adopt the tool as part of their communication practices (Haines and Cooper, 
Forthcoming). 
Against this backdrop, we offer our theory as a means to guide future research on designing and 
applying technology to support awareness creation in context. For example, we suggest to further 
investigate the potential and use of flexible communication tools that allow and enable multiple 
ways of awareness creation instead of trying to build into tools elaborate forms of pre-specified 
awareness features.  In this context, Information Systems as a discipline can make a substantial 
contribution, due to its focus on the interplay between the technical and the social aspects in 
organizational contexts. We offer some starting points for future research. 
Exploring the context-specificity of awareness pools 
Our theory proposes that awareness needs in mediated communication take the form of a 
hierarchy of inter-dependent pools that vary across contexts. As a natural first step, researchers 
might draw upon our framework in exploring the kinds of awareness needs prevalent in different 
organizational contexts. Based on our framework research can then derive specific hypotheses as 
to the different pools likely to play a role in a given context, as well as to their position within 
the hierarchy. In the following paragraphs we offer as a first starting point additional pools and 
prerequisites that are suggested by the results of prior mediated communication research. Many 
of these pools were not included in Figures 3 or 4 because they do not appear to be fundamental 
to either agreement or task-oriented groups.  
We noted earlier that preference is awareness of what the others in the shared space want, and 
appears to fill after identity (i.e., if there is a need to know others’ preferences, one will first wish 
to differentiate among different people in the shared space) (Haines et al., 2006, McLeod, 2000). 
Availability is awareness of when a particular person will be available to accomplish a task or 
engage in interaction, and appears to fill after activity and identity (i.e., if there is a need to know 
others’ availability, one will first wish to differentiate among people and be able to predict what 
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activities will occur) (Steinfield et al., 1999). Similarity/Depth is awareness of the values of 
others and appears to fill after identity (i.e., before one will desire information about the values 
of others, one will wish to differentiate among others in the shared space) (Lea et al., 2001, 
Walther, 1995). Influence is an awareness of the salience of another’s preference, which appears 
to fill after preference and similarity/depth (i.e., if there is a need to know whether one should be 
influenced by others’ preferences, one will wish to differentiate among different people and also 
to be able to determine whether those others share similar values or are opinion leaders) 
(Sassenberg and Postmes, 2002). 
More pools and prerequisites are suggested by looking more broadly at the group process and 
performance research. Location is an awareness of where an activity is occurring or will occur 
and appears to fill after activity (i.e., if one needs to know where particular activities will occur, 
one will first wish to know what activities might occur) (cf., Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). 
Purpose is an awareness of the reason for an activity and appears to fill after activity (i.e., if one 
needs to know why an activity is occurring, one will wish to know what activities are occurring 
or might occur) (cf., Gutwin and Greenberg, 2002). Skill is awareness of another’s ability to 
perform an activity, and appears to fill after identity and activity (i.e., before one will desire to 
know the skills of others, one will wish to know the identities of those in the shared space and 
the activities to be performed) (Goffman, 1961). Role is an awareness of another’s expected 
performance of an activity and appears to also fill after identity and activity (Goffman, 1961). 
Cognitive trust is an awareness that another can or cannot be relied upon to complete a particular 
task, and appears to fill after knowing another’s skills and their reliability (McAllister, 1995). 
Direction is an awareness of the direction/context that the group is working in (i.e., what goals is 
the group moving toward), which arises after knowing the location and purpose of activities 
(Parks and Sanna, 1999, Steiner, 1972). Affective Trust is an awareness that another is caring and 
emotionally trustworthy (McAllister, 1995), which arises after knowing another’s role and their 
affiliation. Responsibility is an awareness of which person bears the responsibility for performing 
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a specific activity and arises after knowing another’s role and purpose for a particular activity. 
Coordination is an awareness of the location where a particular activity will be performed, the 
skill of the person who is performing it, and the relationship with other activities in the work 
environment. 
To illustrate the applicability of our theory with regard to awareness needs, we offer some 
testable hypotheses based on the pools introduced before. (1) Roles take longer to develop in 
virtual teams when team members communicate less information about their presence, activity, 
and identity (Sarker and Sahay, 2003). (2) Trust takes longer to develop in virtual teams if team 
members communicate less information about their presence, skills, and reliability (Jarvenpaa 
and Leidner, 1999). (3) Group influence is higher via anonymous CMC if more information 
about identity, preference, and affiliation are communicated (Haines et al., 2006, Postmes et al., 
1998, Spears and Lea, 1992). (4) Free riding in a GDSS brainstorming context is increased as 
presence and activity are communicated, and decreased as role and identity are communicated 
(Connolly et al., 1990). (5) Evaluation apprehension via CMC is increased as identity and 
affiliation are increased (Dubrovsky et al., 1991, Weisband, 1994). (5) Self-disclosure in on-line 
contexts is increased if awareness of others’ presence is reduced (i.e., low public self awareness), 
and if awareness of one’s own activities are increased (i.e., high private self-awareness) (Joinson, 
2001). 
Exploring the dynamic nature of awareness over time 
While awareness researchers have begun to recognize the evolving nature of awareness needs 
over time (Oemig and Gross, 2007), the dynamic notion of awareness as proposed in our theory 
remains largely under-researched so far. Future research should explore how awareness needs 
shift over time in order to further our understanding of the flexible role of technologies in 
awareness creation and the corresponding user processes of adaptation and appropriation. In 
doing so, our framework accounts for the evolution of awareness needs and the ability of users to 
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direct technology to fulfill those needs. In essence, we recognize that communication technology 
is the tool that carries the streams that users direct toward different pools of awareness. 
More specifically, researchers might turn not only to identifying the different needs over time, 
i.e. the changing of the pool hierarchy, but also to exploring the extent to which certain pools in 
the hierarchy have to be filled in specific encounters of a social group. Our theory proposes that 
awareness develops gradually from very basic notions, e.g. the mere being-there of others, to 
very elaborate understanding of aspects of others, e.g. their physical, bodily presence. While our 
theory captures this understanding, we still know little about the depth of certain pools as well as 
their different stages of filling in a concrete context or how these might be conceptualized (e.g. 
can we identify scales that describes the filling of certain pools?). A typical research questions in 
context might be: How much filling of which types of pools do people need, in a given context, 
to be able to work effectively? 
Exploring the practices of awareness creation 
So far, we have arrived at an appreciation for the necessity to view awareness as resulting from 
practice and at a conceptualization of the mechanisms of awareness creation, as manifested in 
our stream-related propositions above. However, more research is needed to better understand 
the proliferation of shared practices in social contexts. In doing so, future research should also 
aim at understanding why some tools appear to be better than others at facilitating or enabling 
practices of awareness creation (Riemer et al., 2007).  
In our theory we have elaborated on the fundamental mechanisms that breed awareness, i.e. the 
signaling and observing as the two main activities of awareness practices. Future research should 
aim at contextualizing these mechanisms in that it explores the nature of concrete practices and 
the nature of observing and signaling in given organizational contexts. For example: Is signaling 
more conscious/active or a peripheral part of other practices? What technologies are drawn upon 
to carry the streams of signaling information? What role do tools play in feeding certain streams 
automatically, without user involvement? Is signaling done in a more bilateral, idiosyncratic 
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manner, or does it happen on a group-level? Are people aware of the draining of pools and do 
they adapt their practices accordingly? 
As for suitable research methods, rich methods for data collection are needed to appreciate and 
grasp existing social practices and their complexity and embeddedness in organizational 
contexts. Obviously, ethnographic studies and workplace observations are very well suited to 
gain an understanding of how people draw on and use ICT in their practices of distributed work 
and awareness creation (Riemer et al., 2007). As for the exploration of the micro-structure of 
awareness creation activities, i.e. the signaling and observing of awareness creation through 
communication, experimental setups might be best able to control for group-level and 
technology-level influence factors on the proliferation of such practices . 
Implications for Tool Designers 
The simplest advice to practitioners derived from our framework is that technology tools should 
be designed to support users in filling the highest-level pools first: presence, identity, and 
activity. Other awareness researchers offer similar advice (Gross et al., 2005, Gutwin and 
Greenberg, 2002, Jang et al., 2000); however, using the streams and pools metaphor, we offer a 
sense of why those elements of awareness are so critical: by turning the stream to presence, 
identity, and activity (in some cases before any other interaction occurs), these tool designs allow 
users to immediately focus their interaction stream on other aspects of awareness. These 
“downstream” aspects of awareness are more context-specific and may likewise be more critical 
for the groups in getting organized and accomplishing their specific tasks (Haines and Scamell, 
2003). As interaction proceeds, the more fundamental aspects of awareness may be taken for 
granted, meaning that technology that provides this awareness may be ignored. However, we 
have noted that these fundamental awareness needs are likely to recur quickly if interaction 
ceases. 
Other work in context-based awareness technology has similarly recognized that awareness 
needs of interactants change over time. For example, it has been noted that when instant 
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messaging, one typically needs online status (i.e., presence) information about another only 
before a conversation is initiated: presence can be taken for granted as the interaction proceeds 
(Oemig and Gross, 2007). Similarly, the process of group development suggests that different 
aspects of awareness will be important in groups as they continue to work together over a longer 
period of time (Oemig and Gross, 2007, Sarker and Sahay, 2003). However, while our pools and 
streams framework allows for the continuous evolution of information needs, we again note the 
potential for information needs to devolve as the pools drain. In essence, a particular technology 
tool may be perceived of as useful before interaction begins, later to become disused, and finally 
to return to usefulness as the awareness needs of the interactants evolve. Potential reasons for 
awareness needs to change (i.e., evolve or devolve) include: group development over time 
(Haines and Scamell, 2003, Oemig and Gross, 2007), changes in existing member location 
(Riemer et al., 2007), new or leaving group members (Jarvenpaa et al., 1998, Sarker and Sahay, 
2003), and changes in user practices with respect to the technology (Riemer et al., 2007). Thus, 
we believe that tool designers and researchers must recognize the potential for awareness needs 
to evolve, but should explicitly account for a user’s desire to direct the interaction stream among 
awareness pools according to their needs and their perceptions of the needs of others. 
Conclusions 
In summary, we conceive of awareness in mediated communication as building in pools that are 
fed by directing streams of interaction. The interaction streams emerge from the actions of those 
involved in the interaction; specifically, we propose that interaction via mediated communication 
is directed by the interactants according to their need to fill various pools of awareness. By 
introducing this notion of awareness and by providing our framework and a set of propositions 
we hope to propose a useful theory of awareness creation that builds upon a dynamic notion of 
awareness creation and in doing so acknowledges the active role of the user (i.e. human agency) 
and the role of social practice in meeting awareness needs. With our work we contribute to 
ongoing research on computer-mediated communication and awareness in distributed work; we 
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argue that in order to advance our knowledge in this domain we are in need of a distinct 
Information Systems perspective, which treats awareness creation as social practice and moves 
beyond a mere technology view. 
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